In a concerning revelation, a recent watchdog report has shed light on the vulnerability of America’s nuclear secrets to fraudsters and spies. The report, issued by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), highlights the Energy Department’s failure to establish an effective “insider threat” program aimed at safeguarding against internal threats of fraud, leaks, and espionage, despite a presidential order issued a decade ago.
The GAO report emphasizes that the Energy Department has repeatedly ignored recommendations from four independent reviewers, exposing significant gaps in its efforts to create a robust insider threat program.
Disturbingly, the most recent available data from 2017 reveals approximately 250 unclassified insider threat-related security incidents. These incidents involved alarming breaches, such as transmitting classified information through unsecured systems, neglecting security areas, and inadequate protection of classified data.
Furthermore, the report highlights numerous malicious incidents, including the case of a nuclear safety program manager who received bribes totaling nearly $500,000 in exchange for official acts. Such incidents underscore the gravity of the situation and its potential consequences.
The GAO warns that the theft of nuclear material or compromise of sensitive information could have devastating outcomes, both in terms of national security and potential unauthorized access to classified information, workplace violence, or improper handling of sensitive nuclear weapons and materials.
This report follows NBC News’ exclusive coverage last year, revealing that over the past two decades, at least 154 Chinese scientists involved in government-sponsored research at the Energy Department’s Los Alamos National Laboratory were recruited to work on scientific projects in China. Shockingly, some of these projects contributed to advancements in military technologies that pose a direct threat to America’s national security.
A separate report by Strider Technologies exposed what it described as a systematic campaign by the Chinese government to place its scientists at Los Alamos, the birthplace of nuclear weapons. These scientists were subsequently enticed back to China to contribute to the development of technologies such as deep-earth-penetrating warheads, hypersonic missiles, silent submarines, and drones. The report revealed that these scientists were incentivized with substantial payments, reaching up to $1 million, through Beijing’s “talent programs,” specifically designed to attract Chinese researchers to return to their home country.
The revelations from the GAO report and previous investigations highlight the urgent need for comprehensive measures to fortify the protection of America’s nuclear secrets.
It is imperative that the Energy Department takes immediate action to address the shortcomings outlined in the report and implement a robust insider threat program. The security of national nuclear assets and sensitive information must remain an utmost priority to prevent potentially dire consequences for the nation’s security and well-being.
